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Abstract 
Chinese city-level data indicate that differences in growth rates are far more severe than 
indicated in previous studies which typically use data at higher levels of aggregation. We 
estimate growth equations using city-level data and find that the policy of awarding a special 
economic zone status enhances growth substantially, increasing annual growth rates by 5.5 
percentage points.  Annual growth rates of open coastal cities are, on average, 3 percentage 
points higher.  Our qualitative results on the role of policy and the effects of FDI are similar to 
those of earlier studies that have employed provincial-level data; but, quantitatively, our results 
are substantially different. We also provide evidence of an indirect role of policy in the growth 
process through its ability to attract growth-enhancing foreign direct investment. 
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1 Introduction 
 
  Over the past decade, the growth rate of per capita income in China has averaged an 
astounding nine percent per year.
1  This growth, however, has not been shared equally across 
China and a large literature has arisen to examine various aspects of these differences. But 
whereas most recent theoretical literature (e.g., the new economic geography)  assumes the city 
as the natural unit of analysis,
2 most studies of regional inequality in China have used provincial 
level data (e.g. Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Jian et al, 1996; Lin and Lui, 1999).
3  By using city-
level data a key contribution of this paper is thus to provide fresh empirical evidence on the 
determinants of growth at this neglected level of analysis.
4 Another  reason we believe that 
empirical analysis of growth at the city level is most pertinent in China is that government policy 
that awards preferential treatment to certain regions is directly enacted at the city level.  Thus, 
examining the performance of cities is the appropriate level to determine the effect of these 
policies.  A final reason city-level empirical analysis is needed is that, as we show later, 
                                                 
 
1Young (2000a) argues that aggregate growth rates in China are in fact more modest.  He 
attributes the overstatement of China’s overall growth to a systematic understatement of 
inflation. 
 
2See Neary (2001) for a review of the new economic geography literature.  While we do 
not include a specific analysis of geographic attributes in our study, Demurger, Sachs, Woo and 
Bao (2001) point out that policy dummies based on geography also capture the beneficial effects 
of a coastal location, irrespective of policy.  However, when they decompose these effects into a 
geography effect and a policy effect using province-level data, they find a beneficial role for 
both.  Therefore, it is likely that the estimated coefficients on our policy dummies also include 
the effects of beneficial geographic locations. 
 
3 Some studies, however, use household survey data (e.g. Kahn and Riskin, 2001; Riskin 
et al., 2001). 
 
4 These  have been compiled from various years of Urban Statistical Yearbook of China 
Guojia tongjiju chengshi shehui jingji diaocha zongdui.  We should note that Wei (1993) also 
examines city level data in a growth context.  2
differences in growth rates are more severe at the city level, suggesting that aggregating data at 
the province level may disguise some important relationships. 
  Our empirical approach is to estimate growth equations. While other students of regional 
inequality in China have used similar approaches (e.g. Fleisher and Chen, 1997) our particular 
specifications have some novel features. Also, by using city data for the period 1989 to 1999, we 
investigate a period that is substantially longer than in comparable studies.
5 Our approach 
enables us to look for causes of the large disparity in both the growth and level of per capita 
income within China and to examine whether or not existing government policy is exacerbating 
or reducing regional inequality.  Compared to studies that use provincial data, our use of city-
level data allows us to more precisely identify the location of the implementation of different 
policies (e.g., being in an open coastal city vs. a Special Economic Zone) and allows us to draw 
more stark distinctions.  We also gain further understanding of the effect of policy by 
documenting its indirect effect on growth through its ability to attract growth-enhancing foreign 
direct investment.    Overall, and reassuringly, our results are qualitatively similar to previous 
findings that examine regional inequality by using data at other levels. However, our city-level 
analysis refines previous conclusions and finds larger quantitative effects for specific policies. 
Thus, compared to most studies that are based on provincial-level data, we find that there is far 
greater variation in growth at the city level. For example, Demurger, Sachs, Woo and Bao (2001) 
report that the fastest and slowest growing province over the period 1979 to 1998 have annual 
                                                 
 
5 For example, Wei (1993) estimates over a much shorter time period (1988-1990) and 
thus is less able to identify longer-run trends.  Furthermore, we use additional independent 
variables in our analysis (notably domestic as well as foreign investment) that allow us to tie our 
results into the current growth literature.  In some secondary results, Wei does examine growth 
over the period 1980 to 1990 with city-level data, but data availability limits his sample to 
between 14 and 43 observations in this part of his analysis.  3
growth rates that differ by 6.2 percentage points.  As we discuss in more detail below, in our 
city-level data the gap between the fastest and slowest growing city is substantially larger– by 
over 24 percentage points.
6 
  Our main finding is that Chinese government policies that give preferential treatment to 
several cities by promoting openness can account for a large portion of the differences in growth 
rates across cities.  Specifically, our results suggest that the special economic zone status 
increases the annual growth rate of a city by 5.5  percentage points and the awarding of open 
coastal status increases annual growth rates by 3 percentage points. These policies have a direct 
effect on growth by creating an environment that is more responsive to market concerns, and 
they also have an indirect effect by encouraging profit-driven foreign direct investment that itself 
is associated with higher growth rates. Somewhat surprisingly, we find no evidence that higher 
rates of domestic investment are associated with growth rates of per capita income, in spite of 
the fact that both theory and cross-country evidence find a strong and robust positive correlation 
between these variables.  This finding is consistent with other research which finds that domestic 
investment in China may not always primarily be profit driven.
7  
  In some respects, our city-level study strengthens earlier  findings at the province level.  
For example, Chen and Fleisher (1996) find evidence of conditional convergence among Chinese 
                                                 
 
6 Lyons (1998) examines intraprovincial disparities in growth and also finds evidence of 
growing inequality. However his study is confined to one province (Fujian) and he does not 
undertake any hypothesis-testing econometric analysis.  Studies of inequality in China at the 
province level are numerous.  In addition to those discussed above, further examples of recent 
papers include, but are not limited to, Aziz and Duenwald (2001), Dayal-Gulati and Husain 
(2000), Demurger (2000, 2001), Kanbur and Zhang (1999), Li, Liu, and Rebelo (1998), and 
Raiser (1998). 
 
7See Young (2000b), for an analysis of distortions in China during the reform process.  4
provinces during the period 1978 to 1993 after controlling for a province’s coastal location, 
physical investment, employment growth, foreign direct investment, and human capital 
investment.   Jian, Sachs, and Warner (1996) also examine trends in inequality among the 
Chinese provinces over the period 1952 to 1993.  As we do, they find inequality has responded 
to government policy, with more market-oriented reforms resulting in reduced inequality. Lin 
and Liu (2000) and Wang and Hu (1999) study economic growth in the Chinese provinces, 
focusing on the effects of fiscal decentralization and policy aimed at selectively opening up 
regions to international trade and foreign direct investment.
8  In contrast to these studies, we do 
not find income convergence among Chinese regions unless we control for government policy.  
However, because much economic activity in China is not market-driven, we do not offer our 
results as a refutation of the Solow model–only as a study of how growth responds to strong 
government intervention.  
  In addition to finding greater variation in growth at the city-level, we also find that the 
extent of the problem of inequality looms far larger than indicated by many studies and that there 
is no evidence that regional inequality in China is dissipating.
9  As such our findings are more 
similar to recent studies that use household survey for 1995 (e.g. Riskin, et al., 2001). Typically 
they reveal that inequality is a bigger problem than is indicated by conclusions emerging from 
                                                 
 
8Berthelemy and Demurger (2000) argue that foreign direct investment has been 
important in China’s growth through its effect on the level of technology.  Our study 
complements the findings in this paper as well, but, makes additional contributions because, 1) 
we use city-level data to allow us to better identify the effects of specific development policies 
and 2) empirically, we focus on longer term growth rather than annual growth rates. 
 
9 For example, Deininger and Squire provide an estimate of the Gini coefficient in China 
in 1992 (37.80) that is comparable to the U.S. value (37.94 in 1991).  Yang (1999), however, 
argues that using internationally comparable definitions of income increases measured household 
inequality in China considerably.  5
studies that use provincial data and earlier studies that use household survey data. Without a 
change in policy, our findings also predict that the disparity in levels of average incomes will 
increase as the Chinese economy continues to grow. In addition to confirming the conditional 
convergence results of provincial studies at the city level, we also explore the indirect role policy 
plays in generating inequality through its ability to attract profit-driven foreign direct investment. 
  The structure of our paper is as follows.  We continue in Section 2 by reviewing Chinese 
government  policies, especially during the Deng era. In Section 3 our data are described and our 
main estimation results are reported. In Section 4 we further develop our policy conclusions and 
conclude. 
2 China’s Growth Policies: Causes and Consequences 
China has undergone three radical policy changes in its urban development during the 
past five decades: from Mao’s redistributive and egalitarian policies to Deng’s uneven 
development model, and to the current initiative to develop China’s western regions in order to 
narrow the widening regional disparity.
10  Both the rate of economic growth and the degree of 
regional inequality among Chinese cities have changed over time.  
Deng’s economic reforms have designated the city as the center of the regional economy 
and an agent of diffusion of economic growth. The pace of urban development during the reform 
era has corresponded to the rapid growth of the Chinese economy.  The urban population in 
1997, for example, rose to 29.9 per cent of the national total, which was 12 per cent more than in 
1978 (Guo, 1999). Since Deng Xiaoping, the chief architect of China’s economic reform, 
believed that a large country such as China could not achieve rapid economic growth in all its 
various regions simultaneously, both urban development and economic growth have been 
                                                 
 
10For an overview of policy changes in China’s urban development, see Yang, (1990); Li  6
uneven across the country.  By design the Chinese government adopted a trickle-down growth 
strategy to develop a few regional centers of economic strength, beginning with those that 
possess initial advantages such as location, infrastructure, human and natural resources.  
According to this plan, the diffusion of growth would inevitably occur.  The famous aphorism, 
“Let certain regions (and some people) get rich first,” reflected the strategic thinking of the 
Chinese government during the Deng era.  
  This strategic plan specified that cities of the coastal regions in the south and east parts of 
China “should make full use of their advantages to speed up the opening to the outside world and 
quickly develop before others.”
11  When the coastal economy has expanded sufficiently, the state 
should then devote more effort to helping the central and western regions catch up.  While Deng 
and other policy makers were unclear about when and how the state should shift its regional 
emphasis from the coast to the inland, they had specific guidelines and distinct policies for 
gradually opening up Chinese cities.  Opening (kaifang) of these cities means that a favorable 
environment would be established for attracting foreign investment, stimulating export-led 
growth, and promoting infrastructure development.  The central government granted cities 
various special economic status.  They included the special economic zones (SEZs) of Shenzhen, 
Zhuhai, Shantou, and Xiamen (1980); 14 open coastal cities (1984); Hainan island (1988) and 
Shanghai’s Pudong District (1990); free trade zones in coastal cities (1993); open border cities 
and open free trade zones such as the Yangtze Delta and the Pearl River.
12  
These cities and regions were granted “preferential policies” (qingxie zhence).  They 
                                                                                                                                                             
(2001); and Guo, (1999). 
 
11Beijing Review, May 29, 2000, p. 22. 
 
12The status of some cities may overlap. For example, a SEZ city can be part of a free 
trade zone.  For a detailed discussion of China’s opening of these cities and regions, see Fan  7
included: 1) a tax break; 2) favorable terms in loans, credits and subsidies; 3) higher foreign 
exchange retention rates; 4) greater fiscal autonomy; and 5) faster financial and legal approval. 
These policies heavily favored coastal regions at the expense of inland China.  The emphasis on 
coastal development has moved the issue of economic inequality between coastal and inland 
cities to the forefront, especially since Deng’s famous southern journey in 1992 when he granted 
more favorable policy initiatives to the coastal region (Wang and Hu, 1999; and Chen, 1991). In 
2000, the per-capita GDP in west China was only about 60% of the national average. According 
to a survey conducted by China’s National Statistics Bureau in 2000, the top 5% of the richest 
people in the country held almost 50% of private bank savings accounts.  These nouveaux riches 
are disproportionately distributed in the coastal region.
13  Meanwhile, according to Chinese 
official sources, approximately 90 percent of the country’s population who live in absolute 
poverty are located in the western region. 
14  The difference in GDP per capita between Shanghai 
and Guizhou, for example, increased from 7.3 times in 1990 to 12 times in 2000.
15  The growing 
regional disparities were particularly reflected by consumption expenditures.  In 1985 per capita 
expenditures in Shanghai were 299 yuan higher than the national urban average, but the 
differential increased to 2,929 yuan in 1995, with a nearly ten-fold increase in 10 years (Davis, 
2000). 
  If growing disparities in Chinese society are not serious enough, there is also high 
unemployment. The unemployment rate has risen to its highest level since the 1949 Communist 
Revolution. The Chinese government recently admitted that the country had a total of 16 million 
urban unemployed workers in 2000, but the real figure was probably much higher.  At the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1997). 
 
13This figure is based on information found in Urban Statistical Yearbook of China 2000. 
 
14Beijing Review, April 10, 2000, p. 14. 
 
15Shijie ribao, January 12, 2000, A9.  See also Wang and Hu (1999) for details of 
comparison.  8
National People’s Congress annual session held in the spring of 2000, the Chinese government 
made a far-reaching decision to “shift the focus of economic construction from the eastern 
coastal provinces to the western region.”
16 It is, of course, far too early to assess this new 
strategic shift because the development of the western region is “a systematic project and a long-
term task, which may take the efforts of several generations,” borrowing the words of Chinese 
leaders.
17  But Deng’s uneven and spatial development strategy during the past two decades has 
provided sufficient evidence to test the advantages and pitfalls of targeted and diffusion-oriented 
economic policies.  The availability of time series data on Chinese cities of different sizes, 
locations and features makes  this study possible. 
3 Methodology, Data, and Empirical Results 
3.1 Empirical Methodology and Data Description 
  We follow the conceptual framework of the recent growth literature and adapt the 
approach first used by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) and later used in some studies of 
Chinese growth at the provincial level (e.g., Chen and Fleisher, 1996; Lin and Liu, 2000).  To 
study the phenomenon of long-run growth, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil derive an augmented 
Solow model: 
growth in real per capita income = β0 + β1*ln(initial income) + β2*ln(savings rate) +  
β3*ln(population growth) rate+ β4*ln(human capital savings rate) + ε 
where the savings rate, population growth rate, and human capital savings rates are at their 
steady state values and ε is a mean zero normally distributed disturbance term.   To proxy for the 
steady state values, they use the average annual savings rate (investment rate), the average 
                                                 
 
16Beijing Review, April 10, 2000, p. 14 
 
17Beijing Review, April 10, 2000, p. 15  9
secondary school enrollment rate for the human capital savings rate and the actual population 
growth rate over the period.  Thus, Mankiw, Romer, and Weil use cross-country data to study the 
convergence to the steady state in the Solow model after augmenting it to include human capital 
as a factor of production.  Overall, they find that cross-country data is consistent with the Solow 
model and conditional convergence. 
  In order to understand the determinants of growth within China and study the question of 
convergence in regional incomes, we use this equation, with a few modifications, as a baseline 
specification.  Consistent with the existing cross-country growth literature, one can interpret the 
changes to the original specification derived by Mankiw, Romer, and Weil as either 1) changes 
in the way we measure the economic fundamentals such as physical capital or human capital 
savings rates or 2) factors that may affect the economic environment in which production takes 
place and, therefore, may have an indirect effect on growth through their influence on the 
determination of the steady state income level.  In particular, if policy creates a higher steady 
state income level for a given city, after controlling for initial income, the city with the higher 
steady state should grow faster.
18   
  Specifically, one important modification in measurement is that we distinguish between 
domestic and foreign direct investment and allow their effects to differ.  Thus, rather than 
including a total investment rate, we include both a domestic investment rate and a foreign direct 
investment rate because domestic and foreign investors may face different incentives.  This 
would be the case if domestic investment is not market driven.  Similarly, following Barro 
(1995) in some of our specifications we also control separately for government spending and 
                                                 
 
18Jones (2000) discusses this point in more detail.  Interested readers should also see 
Temple (1999) for a survey of the empirical growth literature.  10
investment in infrastructure, on the theory that this type of government investment may also 
impact growth in a different manner than domestic or foreign investment.   
  In addition to allowing investment that is done by different segments of the economy to 
have differential effects, we also deviate slightly from cross-country studies of growth in our 
measurement of human capital savings.  Secondary school enrollment rates are not available for 
Chinese cities so we use total number of people in high school divided by total population.
19  
Although slightly different from the measure commonly used in cross-country analysis, our 
measure does capture the essential notion that cities that have a larger percentage of their 
population in high school are accumulating human capital at a faster rate.  Of course, even 
without limitations put on our study by the lack of availability of data, secondary school 
enrollment rates serve only as a proxy for human capital savings rates. 
  The third way in which we will augment the base specification is by considering 
government policy that may affect the environment in which production takes place.  
Government policy may have an effect on growth over and above the effect of investment in 
physical and human capital if it influences the efficiency of production.  More efficient 
production creates a higher steady state level of income and, after controlling for initial income, 
generates faster growth.  Later we also examine the effect that policy has on growth through its 
effect on physical capital accumulation. 
  The data we use in our analysis are compiled from the Urban Statistical Yearbook of 
                                                 
 
19The human capital savings used in Mankiw Romer and Weil are total number of people 
in high school/number of people of high school age multiplied by the fraction of the working age 
population that is of school age.  Our measure of human capital savings is also used by Chen and 
Fleisher (1996). 
  We should also point out that all of our “savings” variables (i.e., investment, fdi, and 
human capital savings variables) are averages over the entire period.  This treatment is consistent  11
China which contain data on over 600 Chinese cities.  Unfortunately, all the variables that are 
crucial for our analysis are not available for each city and we are able to use only 204 cities at 
the prefecture level and above in our analysis.
20  Thus, our study focuses on the largest cities in 
China and we are unable to comment on factors affecting growth in the smallest cities due to 
data limitations. 
  Table 1 summarizes the variables available to us and provides some descriptive statistics.  
As we mentioned at the outset, a striking feature of the data is the large variation in growth rates 
across cities.  Although, the average annual growth rate of per capita income in these 204 cities 
was an impressive 8 percent over this ten year period, a greater than 24 percentage point spread 
between the fastest growing and fastest declining city is even more noteworthy. These striking 
figures imply that reporting growth at levels higher than cities tends to aggregate- out much of 
the variation.
21  Large variance in other variables is also evident in our data, underscoring the 
                                                                                                                                                             
with the theoretical framework derived in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil. 
 
20We use data for each city that includes the urban area only and not outlying areas.  The 
reader will note that the number of observations used in each specification varies from 200 to 
204.  Observations are excluded due to lack of availability of all of the independent variables.  
Restricting all of our estimations to a common set of 200 cities does not materially affect the 
results presented.  
   Ideally, we would like to extend our data backwards in time.  This would allow us to 
perform panel estimations and also to examine some of the cities prior to the granting of their 
special economic status.  Since we are interested in studying the phenomena of long-run growth, 
however, it is necessary to examine growth over sufficiently long periods of time and data 
limitations prevent us from doing so.  Furthermore, estimating growth equations with panel data 
is complicated by econometric problems which can only be solved by using additional time 
periods in the panel to instrument for the lagged dependent variable.  (See Caselli, Esquivel, and 
LeFort, 1996, or Judson and Owen, 1999, for a discussion of this issue.)  Panel analysis of 
annual fluctuations in growth rates would be possible with our data, however, our results would 
be unable to shed light on long-run differences in income growth.  
 
21 Note also that in Table 1 we report descriptive statistics only for those cities which we 
later use in our regressions.  In fact, growth rates over this period are available for another 233 
smaller cities.  Descriptive statistics on this larger set of cities reveal an even wider range in 
growth rates.    12
large differences in standards of living within China.  Initial per capita income in the richest city 
is over 50 times per capita income in the poorest city and wide ranges in investment, population 
growth, and foreign direct investment are also apparent. Notably, some cities receive virtually no 
foreign direct investment while others receive an amount equal to half their GDP.
22  Domestic 
investment rates (where “Domestic” refers to investment by Chinese residents and not only 
residents of that city) have even wider variation, with some cities recording investment greater 
than their GDP.     
  The geographic distribution of cities in our sample of 204 cities (i.e., location of cities in 
the East, Central or Western part of China) is similar to that in the larger population of 670 cities 
that are listed in the Urban Statistical Yearbook of China.  Specifically, approximately 42 
percent of the cities in our sample are in the East, 21 percent are in the West, and 37 percent are 
located in Central China.
23  Descriptive statistics for each geographic region (not reported in 
Table 1) also highlight the variation in growth rates and incomes with cities in the East having 
higher average growth rates and incomes (average annual growth rate of 9 percent and average 
income per capita of 3,965 yuan) and cities in the West and Central region of China having 
lower growth rates and incomes (average annual growth rates of 8 and 7 percent and income per 
                                                                                                                                                             
  We should note that we use official population figures in our analysis and therefore do 
not capture unofficial migration.  This introduces measurement error into both our dependent 
variable (growth of per capita income) and in an independent variable, population growth.  To 
address the issue of measurement error in our dependent variable, we implement a 
hetereoskedasticity correction for our standard errors.  Ideally, one would like to instrument for 
the potentially mismeasured population growth variable, however, suitable instruments are not 
available and there is likely some attenuation bias in this coefficient. 
 
22The Urban Statistical Yearbooks of China report FDI in US dollars.  To convert these 
statistics to yuan we used market exchange rates–with annual rates being averages of daily rates.  
To the extent that the annual FDI amount flows into the country evenly over the course of the 
year, this is a reasonable estimate of the value of that FDI in yuan in a particular year. 
 
23Geographic classifications of cities follows Wang and Hu (1999).  13
capita of 2,624 yuan and 2,721 yuan, respectively).  Although cities in each region of the country 
have similar rates of domestic investment, human capital savings, and population growth, cities 
in the East have higher rates of FDI.  The average level of FDI/GDP for cities in the East is 8.6 
percent, but for the West and Central regions is only 2.5 percent and 2.4 percent respectively.  
Furthermore, cities in the East are disproportionately beneficiaries of government policy, with all 
of the SEZ and open coastal cities being in the East. 
3.2 Factors Affecting Growth of Per Capita Income 
  The results from some baseline growth regressions reported in Table 2 reveal two 
relatively robust relationships that are consistent with the neoclassical theory–a positive 
relationship between FDI and growth and a negative relationship between population growth and 
growth of per capita income.  In particular, the first column of Table 1 reports an estimation that 
mirrors the basic growth equation in Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992).  Unlike the cross-
country results, however, we do not find a statistically significant relationship between domestic 
investment and growth or human capital and growth.  Furthermore, although the coefficient on 
per capita income comes in with a negative sign, it is statistically significant in only one 
specification and provides only weak evidence for conditional convergence among Chinese 
cities.   
  As we alluded to earlier, our inability to find evidence of a strong relationship between 
domestic investment and growth may be due to inefficiently allocated investment in this non-
market transition economy.  Our results for human capital are also puzzling in light of the cross-
country growth literature, however, they are consistent with earlier studies of growth within 
China.  For example, although Wei (1993) does not include domestic investment in his  14
estimations, he finds a negative and sometimes statistically significant relationship between 
human capital and growth using an alternative measure of human capital–the percent of the labor 
force that has a scientific or technical occupation.  Chen and Fleisher (1996) also find a 
statistically insignificant relationship between human capital savings and growth at the province 
level.  However, using an alternative human capital measure, university level education, Fleisher 
and Chen (1997) find a positive relationship between human capital and TFP growth.  
Unfortunately, this measure of human capital is not consistently available to us in city-level data.   
  Finally, in column 6, we add two measures of government policy that might affect 
growth–initial infrastructure (INFRA89) and initial local government spending (LGE89).
24  
Contrary to cross-country results, LGE89 enters positively and significantly while we cannot 
find evidence for a role for infrastructure.   
  Overall, the results in Table 2 indicate that higher rates of foreign direct investment and 
lower rates of population growth are related to higher growth of per capita income as the Solow 
model would predict.  There is weak evidence for conditional convergence.  However, other 
results are at odds with this model:  a robust correlation between domestic investment and 
growth or human capital and growth that has been found consistently in cross-country data does 
not exist.  
  Given the policies implemented by the Chinese government aimed at enriching only a 
few cities, however, one would not expect the Chinese economy as a whole to exhibit free 
market behavior.  If free-market policies enhance the efficiency of production, cities that benefit 
from these policies should have higher steady states and should grow faster, after controlling for 
                                                 
 
24Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1995) show that government consumption is negatively 
related to growth in cross-country data, suggesting that greater government consumption is  15
fundamental determinants of growth such as initial income or physical and human capital 
savings rates.  In Table 3, we attempt to control for these policies by adding dummy variables 
indicating whether the city received preferential treatment.  Column 1 of Table 3 reports results 
in which we control for a city being in a free trade zone (FREETRADE).  The results in Column 
1 suggest that being in a free trade zone has a positive and statistically significant effect on 
growth.  Column 2 reports results after controlling for Special Economic Zone status (SEZ), 
being in an open coastal city (COAST) or being in an open border city (BORDER) and suggest 
that cities awarded the special economic zone status and open coastal cities also grew faster.  
Because free trade zones may also be part of special economic zones, open coastal or border 
cities, it is difficult to determine exactly which policy is responsible for growth.  The results in 
column 3 show that when dummy variables are added to incorporate all of these policies 
simultaneously, the coefficient on free trade zones retains its positive sign but loses statistical 
significance.  This allows us to suggest that it is the SEZ status of the city and not just a free 
trade zone per se that is a more important determinant of growth.
25  Columns 4 and 5 of Table 3 
replicate the estimations in columns two and three, this time using the open cities along the 
Yangtze River as the policy of interest (YANGTZE).  These results show that cities given this 
kind of preferential treatment also grew faster than the others in this time period.  Furthermore, 
the free trade policy also has a separate, positive effect on growth.   
  Our results for the other coefficients in the growth equations are also slightly different 
when we control for the policy environment.  Specifically, there is now stronger evidence of 
conditional convergence with the negative coefficient on initial income becoming statistically 
                                                                                                                                                             
associated with a less efficient allocation of resources. 
 
25Though, clearly, the presence of multicollinearity urges caution in this interpretation.  16
significant in all five estimations.  It is interesting that both the positive coefficients on FDI and 
on our policy variables  remain even when the two variables are entered into the regressions 
simultaneously, suggesting that the effects of these policies extends beyond that of encouraging 
FDI. 
  It is important to note that the effects of preferential treatment by the Chinese 
government are substantially larger than those of comparable studies at the provincial level.  The 
results in column 1 of Table 3 indicate that being in a free trade zone raised the annual growth 
rate of per capita income by 2.4 percentage points.  The results in column 2 indicate an even 
more substantial increase of 4 percentage points for cities awarded special economic zone 
status.
26  These results also shed light on the discrepancies between city growth rates in the East, 
Central, and Western regions of China.  Earlier we noted that the average FDI/GDP is much 
higher in the East than in the West and Central regions.  The results in Table 3 suggest that 
increasing FDI from the average level in the West and Central regions to the average level in the 
East would increase annual growth rates by a full percentage point. 
  Although we have approximately 200 cities in each of our estimations, we are concerned 
that some of the policy variables we analyze apply to only a small number of cities in our 
sample, and therefore, our results might be influenced by outliers.  In order to address this 
                                                 
 
26The most closely related empirical study to ours is that of Chen and Fleisher (1996).  
Because they use province-level data, their specification is slightly different from ours and does 
not include a SEZ dummy in addition to a coastal dummy (the majority of SEZ zones are in one 
province–Guangdong).  When we replicate their specification with our city-level data and use 
only a coastal dummy, our results with city level data are remarkably close to theirs.  With our 
data and their specification, we find that being on the coast increases annual growth rates by 2.2 
percentage points while their results indicate an increase in annual growth of 2.6 to 2.8 
percentage points.  This highlights the importance of using city-level data to assess city-level 
policies because, at this level of aggregation, we are able to identify the effects of different types 
of policies.  17
possibility, we present in Table 4 the results of estimating the effects of development policy and 
using a robust estimation technique.  To control for the influence of outliers, we used an iterative 
technique in which we downweight outliers.  Essentially, our technique removes observations for 
which Cook’s D > 1 and then iteratively selects weights for the remaining observations, with the 
observations that have the largest residuals being awarded the lowest weight.
27 
  The results presented in Table 4 confirm many of our major findings from our original 
estimations.  Initial income remains negatively related to subsequent growth as does population 
growth, consistent with the predictions of the Solow model.  The coefficients on FDI remain 
positive and significant and of comparable size, while the coefficients on domestic investment 
are insignificant, consistent with the results reported in Table 2.  The impact of higher levels of 
human capital savings after controlling for policy also remains unclear as the positive 
coefficients are not statistically significant at conventional significance levels.  Results using the 
robust estimation technique also find a slightly more modest role for policy.  The estimates in 
column 2 of Table 4 now indicate that SEZ status increases annual growth rates by 3.2 
percentage points and open coastal cities have annual growth rates 1.7 percentage point higher.  
Furthermore, the coefficients on the YANGTZE dummy variable lose statistical significance.
28   
  A final important point about the results in Table 4 is that because equation 1 is derived 
from a production function framework, it is possible to infer properties of the production process 
from our estimated coefficients.  In particular, estimated coefficients in Table 4 suggest that the 
capital accumulated through foreign direct investment does have declining marginal 
productivity. Specifically, using the estimated coefficients in column 3 of Table 4 and assuming 
                                                 
 
27See Hamilton (1991) for details on this procedure. 
 
28We do need to be cautious in the interpretation of this result as this was a policy that  18
that the production function takes on a Cobb-Douglas form,  y Ak =
α , where y is per capita 
income and k is the per capita stock of foreign capital, one can calculate a point estimate of the 
implied value of alpha of .46, which is consistent with the implied value of α calculated by 
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) with cross country data.
29   The presence of diminishing 
returns  calls into question the efficiency of a trickle-down development policy.  The increased 
inequality that results from policies that encourage foreign investment in only a limited number 
of geographic locations does not seem to be justified by increased efficiency.
30  This finding is 
consistent with the fact that we find evidence for income convergence only after controlling for 
the preferential status of specific cities.
31 
 
3.3 Determinants of Foreign Direct Investment 
                                                                                                                                                             
was initiated in the middle of the period we observe. 
 
29While using the coefficients from other specifications results in slight deviations from 
this point estimate, taken together, these results still suggest similar values of α. The derivation 
of this estimate is a direct result of the fact that, in this framework, the coefficient on 
ln(percap89) is 1-e
-λt (where λ is the rate of convergence) and the coefficient on fdi is (1-e
-
λt)(α/1-α) .  Mankiw, Romer, and Weil report implied values of α ranging from .38 to .48.  (See 
Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) for details on the derivation.) 
 
30In trying to determine the overall effect of these policies on growth, one may be 
tempted to consider an indirect effect between inequality and growth.  Whereas earlier empirical 
literature found a negative relationship between inequality and growth (e.g., Persson and 
Tabellini 1994), more recently that relationship has been called into question.  (See for example, 
Banerjee and Duflo 2000 for a discussion of this literature.)  One would want to be cautious in 
applying any of these results to China, however, as 1) most theoretical explanations between 
inequality and growth are based on inequality at the household level which is not the focus of 
our study, and 2) these theories have been developed to explain behavior in free market, usually 
democratic, economies. 
 
31The effect of foreign direct investment reported by the province-level study of Chen 
and Fleisher (1996) is much larger than the one we obtain using city-level data.  In our 
specification, a one standard deviation increase in the log of FDI/GDP results in approximately a 
1.3 percentage point increase in annual growth rates.  The coefficients reported in Chen and 
Fleisher (1996) suggest that a similar increase in FDI/GDP would result in a 13.7 percentage  19
  The growth regressions discussed above find that foreign direct investment is an 
important determinant of growth.  Summary statistics in Table 1, however, show that foreign 
direct investment varies widely across the cities.  In this section, we explore the determinants of 
foreign direct investment and comment on factors that may be indirectly influencing growth 
through their effects on FDI.  Table 5 presents the results of this investigation, suggesting overall 
that foreign direct investment is responding to non-market forces.  The results in column 1 show 
that cities that have higher per capita income received more foreign direct investment.  Not 
surprisingly, cities with free trade zones also had higher foreign direct investment rates, but it is 
interesting that cities with more human capital investment (a larger percentage of the population 
in high school) received less.  Also, the results in column 1 do not find a role for local 
government spending or infrastructure in attracting foreign direct investment.  
  Further results in columns 2 through 5 reinforce the effects of policy on attracting foreign 
direct investment.  Unsurprisingly, the significant positive coefficient on special economic zones 
(SEZ) show that these cities are particularly attractive to FDI as are open coastal cities.   Our 
conclusion that FDI is flowing to cities with high initial per capita incomes is still supported by 
these estimations which also control for policy.  
  The results in Table 5 argue for an even stronger role for policy in affecting growth 
through its affect on the ability of the city to attract foreign direct investment.  Taking the point 
estimates in column 2 of Tables 3 and 5, one can calculate that granting an average city special 
economic zone status would increase the average annual growth rate over this period by about 
5.5  percentage points–i.e., that city would experience annual growth rates substantially above 
the average.  Open coastal cities also benefit.  Incorporating both the direct effects of this policy 
                                                                                                                                                             
point increase in annual growth rates.  20
on growth from Table 3 and the indirect from Table 5, we find that open coastal cities have 
annual growth rates approximately 3 percentage points higher. 
  Table 6 shows the results of robust estimation on the determinants of FDI which are 
similar to the results we presented earlier.  Overall, these results suggest that foreign direct 
investment is responding to a profit motive, but that government policy is able to affect the 
profits and direct investors to specific regions.  The magnitudes of the effects suggested by these 
robust estimates are similar to those reported earlier. 
4 Conclusion 
  To investigate regional differences in long-run growth rates in China we provide one of 
the first empirical analyses that uses city-level data.  Compared to most studies that are based on 
the more commonly-used  provincial-level data, we find that a different picture emerges when 
the issues of growth and equity are examined  using city-level data. At root we find that there is 
far greater variation in growth at the city level.  As with recent studies based on household 
survey data for 1995 , (though unlike some findings based on provincial data and earlier 
household survey studies), city-level data indicate that  recent years in China have witnessed a 
“retreat from equality” (Riskin, et al., 2001).
32 In our empirical analysis, we estimate growth 
equations using data from 204 Chinese cities during the period 1989 to 1999.  A key focus is 
whether or not existing government policy is exacerbating or reducing regional inequality. Our 
main finding is that Chinese government policies that give preferential treatment to several cities 
by promoting openness can account for a large portion of the differences in growth rates across 
                                                 
 
32 For example, Fan (1997) concludes that provincial inequalities were decreasing as 
reform progressed. By contrast Yao and Zhang (2001)  use provincial data and find evidence of 
increasing inequality between regions. We reach a conclusion similar to Yao and Zhang but also 
establish that sometimes there is increasing intra-regional inequality.   21
cities.  These policies affect growth directly by creating an environment more conducive to 
production and indirectly by encouraging foreign direct investment to flow to these cities.  The 
magnitudes of these effects we find with our city-level analysis are larger than those documented 
with province-level data; we estimate that the effect of awarding SEZ status is a 5.5 percentage 
point increase in the annual growth rate of real per capita income. 
  Whether or not China’s trickle-down approach to development and the resulting increase 
in regional inequality will eventually result in the highest per capita income for all depends on 
the presence of increasing returns. However, our results suggest that capital accumulated through 
foreign direct investment is in fact subject to diminishing returns.  Thus, a policy that promotes 
more equitable development would also produce faster growth.  Overall, our results suggest that 
without policy that gives preferential treatment to certain cities, the process of growth in China 
would generate income convergence and more regional equality. 
  More broadly, our results contribute to the literature on openness and growth, providing 
some evidence that more open economies grow faster particularly when domestic investment is 
influenced by political considerations.
33 In addition to cross-country studies, studies of regional 
convergence have been used as a test of neoclassical growth theory.  Barro and Sala-I-Martin 
(1991, 1992, 1995) have found evidence of convergence among the U.S. states, the Japanese 
prefectures, and among Western European regions. 
  Of course, data availability and data quality remain issues for the study of growth in 
China. A natural extension of the results we have presented in this paper is to consider additional 
city-level variables that might affect the process of growth as well as to construct comparable 
data sets at the provincial level.   This work is currently in progress. 
                                                 
 
33Ben-David (1993), Dollar (1991), and Rodrik and Rodriguez (1999) are just a few of 
the papers that have examined the effects of openness on long-run growth.  22
Table 1: Data Definitions and Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Obs.  Mean  SD  Min  Max  Definition 
growth  204  7.96  3.73 -3.41 20.65 average annual growth of real per 
capita income 1989-1999
percap89 204  3232  3232 376 20837 1989 per capita income (in 1989 
Yuan) 
inv  204  31.31  15.71 7.23 130.80 average domestic investment rate 
(average of domestic 
investment/GDP in 1989 through 
1999)
popgrow  204  3.26  3.81 0.11 22.36 average annual population growth 
rate 1989-1999
highschl  204  6.58  1.15 3.49 10.88 average percent of population 
enrolled in high school, 1989 
through 1999
fdi  204  5.10  7.57 0.00 51.57 average foreign direct investment 
rate (average of FDI/GDP, 1989 
through 1999, FDI converted to 
Yuan via market exchange rate)
infra89  204  274.37  361.23 16 2818 city’s highway construction in 
10,000 square meters in 1989
lge89  204  10.34  5.27 1.19 55.44 local government spending/GDP in 
1989
freetrade  204  0.054  0.226 0 1  equals 1 if in free trade zone
yangtze  204  0.044  0.206 0 1 equals 1 if in Yangtze River 
economic zone
SEZ  204  0.024  0.155 0 1 equals one if in Special Economic 
Zone
coast  204  0.069  0.253 0 1 equals one if in coastal open city
border  204  0.039  0.195 0 1 equals one if in border open city
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Table 2: Baseline Growth Regressions 
Dependent Variable: Growth 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ln(percap89) -0.5771 
(0.76) 
-1.3170 
(1.54) 
-1.3433 
(1.65)* 
-0.8123 
(1.17) 
ln(inv) -0.2525 
(0.34) 
-0.3895 
(0.47) 
 
 
-0.6793 
(0.96) 
ln(popgrow) 
 
-1.0861 
(2.50)** 
-1.2400 
(2.97)** 
-1.2366 
(3.01)** 
-1.4052 
(3.69)** 
ln(highschl) 
 
0.7746 
(0.46) 
1.8578 
(1.12) 
1.7246 
(0.97) 
1.6612 
(1.03) 
ln(fdi) 
 
 
 
1.0205 
(4.33)** 
1.0144 
(4.25)** 
0.9414 
(3.88)** 
infra89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.0003 
(0.38) 
lge89 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14.2915 
(1.74)* 
Constant 
 
12.7785 
(2.84)** 
16.2840 
(3.52)** 
15.4409 
(3.02)** 
12.2675 
(2.78)** 
Observations  204 200 200 200 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
0.05 
 
0.15 
 
0.16 0.18 
 
    Robust t-statistics in parentheses 
    **significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level  
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Table 3: Effects of Development Policies on Growth of Per Capita Income 
Dependent Variable: growth 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(percap89)  -1.5715 -1.7157 -1.7192 -1.3636 -1.6161 
  (1.82)*  (1.98)** (1.97)** (1.58)  (1.86)* 
ln(inv)  -0.4842 -0.5160 -0.5185 -0.3948 -0.4890 
  (0.61) (0.64) (0.65) (0.48) (0.61) 
ln(fdi)  0.9027 0.8276 0.8266 1.0117 0.8945 
  (3.71)** (3.27)** (3.26)** (4.27)** (3.65)** 
ln(popgrow)  -1.2149 -1.3318 -1.3265 -1.2660 -1.2405 
  (2.94)** (3.28)** (3.18)** (3.02)** (2.98)** 
ln(highschl)  2.2070 2.1011 2.1100 1.9352 2.2815 
  (1.33) (1.27) (1.27) (1.18) (1.39) 
freetrade  2.4348   0.1708   2.4238 
  (2.67)**   (0.15)   (2.64)** 
SEZ    3.9891 3.8533    
    (3.26)** (2.65)**    
coast    2.0982 2.0153    
    (2.57)** (2.05)**    
border    1.3136 1.3138    
    (1.51) (1.51)    
yangtze     1.2703  1.2486 
     (1.91)*  (1.96)** 
Constant  17.9193 19.3615 19.3775 16.4970 18.1213 
  (3.85)** (4.20)** (4.18)** (3.55)** (3.88)** 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
0.17 0.18 0.18 0.16 0.17 
 
Robust  t-statistics  in  parentheses       
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level   
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Table 4: Policy Analysis with Robust Regression 
Dependent Variable: growth 
   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(percap89)  -0.9614 -1.0824 -1.0892 -0.7884 -1.0230 
 (1.93)*  (2.15)**  (2.15)**  (1.61)  (2.05)** 
ln(inv)  -0.7384 -0.7410 -0.7430 -0.6880 -0.7091 
  (1.31) (1.30) (1.30) (1.21) (1.25) 
ln(fdi)  1.0378 0.9675 0.9666 1.1349 1.0345 
  (5.15)** (4.70)** (4.67)** (5.78)** (5.11)** 
ln(popgrow)  -1.3053 -1.4047 -1.3956 -1.3655 -1.3406 
  (4.76)** (5.03)** (4.91)** (4.93)** (4.86)** 
ln(highschl)  1.6256 1.5444 1.5538 1.4095 1.7349 
  (1.11) (1.04) (1.04) (0.95) (1.18) 
freetrade 1.9581    0.2456   1.9528 
 (1.78)*    (0.15)    (1.77)* 
SEZ   3.2269  3.0334     
   (1.99)**  (1.47)     
coast   1.6624  1.5429     
   (1.73)*  (1.25)     
border   1.3342  1.3350     
   (1.13)  (1.12)     
yangtze       1.1317  1.1123 
       (1.01)  (1.00) 
Constant  14.9243 16.0252 16.0622 13.7953 15.0773 
  (3.95)** (4.16)** (4.15)** (3.68)** (3.97)** 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses        
* significant at 5% level; ** significant at 1% level   
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Table 5: Determinants of FDI 
Dependent Variable: ln(fdi) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(percap89)  0.7048 0.5950 0.5950 0.8777 0.6992 
  (3.12)** (2.52)** (2.52)** (4.10)** (3.09)** 
ln(inv)  0.0597 0.0660 0.0628 0.0814 0.0589 
  (0.25) (0.28) (0.26) (0.34) (0.25) 
ln(popgrow)  0.1396 0.0918 0.0996 0.1338 0.1330 
  (1.62) (1.10) (1.16) (1.50) (1.53) 
ln(highschl)  -0.9376 -0.8957 -0.8818 -1.1670 -0.9240 
  (1.83)* (1.74)* (1.71)* (2.21)**  (1.80)* 
lge89  1.7055 1.0708 1.0506 2.9398 1.7439 
  (0.96) (0.61) (0.60) (1.60) (0.98) 
infra89  -0.0001  0.0000 -0.0000  0.0002 -0.0001 
  (0.29) (0.21) (0.07) (1.19) (0.36) 
freetrade  1.3985   0.3738   1.3985 
  (5.21)**   (1.39)   (5.15)** 
SEZ    1.7595 1.4591    
    (4.19)** (3.35)**    
coast    1.1271 0.9636    
    (5.37)** (3.80)**    
border    0.0691 0.0837    
    (0.25) (0.30)    
yangtze     0.2353  0.2357 
     (0.92)  (0.96) 
Constant  -3.4661 -2.6653 -2.6728 -4.6098 -3.4506 
  (1.98)**  (1.46) (1.46) (2.76)**  (1.97)** 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
0.16 0.18 0.18 0.12 0.16 
 
Robust  t-statistics  in  parentheses       
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level 
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Table 6: FDI Determinants, Robust Regression 
Dependent Variable: ln(fdi) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ln(percap89)  0.8198 0.6766 0.6861 1.0364 0.8056 
  (4.49)** (3.63)** (3.67)** (5.71)** (4.39)** 
ln(inv)  0.0881 0.1148 0.1086 0.0716 0.0904 
  (0.47) (0.63) (0.59) (0.37) (0.48) 
ln(popgrow)  0.1548 0.1064 0.1146 0.1430 0.1496 
  (1.60) (1.11) (1.19) (1.42) (1.53) 
ln(highschl)  -0.6699 -0.6017 -0.5725 -0.7908 -0.6727 
  (1.36) (1.23) (1.17) (1.57) (1.36) 
lge89  0.9739 0.1576 0.1062 1.9850 1.0268 
  (0.59) (0.10) (0.06) (1.19) (0.62) 
infra89  -0.0000  0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 -0.0000 
  (0.07) (0.40) (0.22) (0.99) (0.11) 
freetrade  1.2581   0.3235   1.2665 
  (3.24)**   (0.58)   (3.25)** 
SEZ    1.6595 1.3984    
   (3.05)**  (1.99)*     
coast    1.0093 0.8564    
   (3.12)**  (2.12)*     
border    -0.0477 -0.0392    
    (0.12) (0.10)    
yangtze     0.1496  0.1560 
     (0.38)  (0.41) 
Constant  -4.8680 -3.9028 -4.0005 -6.4112 -4.7659 
  (3.49)** (2.75)** (2.81)** (4.58)** (3.40)** 
Observations  200 200 200 200 200 
Adjusted R-
squared 
 
0.21 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20 
Absolute value of t-statistics in parentheses           
** significant at 5% level; * significant at 10% level   
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